This note is concerned with the e¤ects of joint ownership of complements when they are vertically di¤erentiated. We provide strong arguments for the positive nature of network integration among …rms, while showing at the same time that, in some circumstances, anti-competitive consequences can be observed under acquisition.
Introduction
This note is concerned with the e¤ects of M&As between producers of asymmetric complementary goods in vertically di¤erentiated markets. Since the pioneristic work by Cournot (1938) , the view that an intergrated monopoly may be bene…cial to consumers is generally shared. The joint ownership of complements bene…ts consumers as it removes a problem of double marginalization while possibly passing through to consumers further gains. 1 This clear-cut merger's implication is mitigated in oligopoly markets. Indeed, while the joint ownership determines "vertical"integration between producers of di¤erent components, it also decreases competition in the market while inducing "horizontal"integration between producers of a given component. While the former e¤ect pushes prices downwards, the latter pushes prices upward (Economides and Salop 1992) . 2 In this note, we re-examine the above evoked competing e¤ects in a framework of vertical di¤erentiation. We put the argument in the simpest possible setting. There is an incumbent monopolist that produces a base good. This good can be equipped with a complementary component, which is produced by the monopolist itself and a potential entrant. The value of the base good increases with the quality of the complementary component with which it is bundled. The monopolist produces a complementary component whose quality is assumed to be lower than that produced by the potential entrant. When facing the rival, the monopolist can either deter entry by selling pure bundles, so that only the low quality system is marketed; or accept entry by o¤ering mixed bundles, so that both qualities are available; or acquire the entrant, in which case only the high quality system is put on sale. We prove that, if allowed, acquisition would be always observed at equilibrium. Otherwise mixed bunbling would arise. Further, we show that acquisition could be welfare improving under some conditions on market size and quality di¤erential among complements. This holds as in vertically differentiated markets, under joint ownership, on one hand the traditional 1 For example, when the quality of a two-products system is determined by the minimum of the qualities of its components, an integrated monopoly in which both complementary goods are sold by a single integrated …rm dominates complementary monopolies (namely, independent ownership) in terms of welfare implications: in fact, the …rst entails higher quality goods'and higher market coverage (Economides 1999 , Maruyama et al. 2011 ) while neutralizing the vertical externality of double marginalization. 2 Recent contributions show that welfare losses may be also due to the practice of mixed bundling by merged …rms or foreclosure (Choi 2008 , Flores-Fillol and Moner-Colonques 2011). Interestingly, both these pratices develop along a reducingcompetition dimension.
welfare enhancing e¤ect (taking place when the double marginalization is removed) can be magni…ed by an increase in the average quality of consumption; on the other hand, the negative horizontal externality can play a minor role when the market is su¢ ciently large. 3 These arguments can be valuable for competition agencies when evaluating mergers in vertically di¤erentiated markets.
The basic framework
We consider a market with a monopolist I and a potential entrant E. The monopolist sells a base good of quality u to a population of consumers identi…ed by the parameter 2 [a; b], 0 a < b and uniformly distributed with density equal to 1. Both the monopolist I and the potential entrant E can sell a complementary asset of quality v I and v E , respectively, with v E > v I . The complementary good does not bring any value to the consumers who do not buy the base good. Still, it allows the base good to perform better. Let u i be the overall quality of the base good when sold equipped with the complementary variant v i , i = I; E, u E > u I > u holds. 4 The average cost of production of both the base good and the complementary assets are assumed to be constant and, without loss of generality, equal to zero. When facing the rival, the monopolist can deter entry by selling pure bundles (PB); accept entry by o¤ering mixed bundles (MB), namely both the base good without further complementary variant and the low quality bundle; acquire the entrant and thus sell on its behalf the complementary high quality variant v E . In this latter case, the incumbent has to pay an acquisition price to the entrant while avoiding open competition.
We analyse these scenarios in turn, from both a private and a social welfare point of view. 
Under mixed bundling, each consumer can either buy only the base good at price p u and get utility u p u ; or buy the base good equipped with the low quality (resp. high quality) complementary variant at some price P I (resp. p u +r E ; where r E is the price of v E sold by the entrant) in which case the utility is u I P I (resp. u E p u r E ); or refrain from buying. At equilibrium the incumbent …nds it pro…table to quote for the base good a price p u so high that no consumer buys the base good alone. Then, the …rst consumer willing to buy something is = P I u I . 6 Accordingly, the incumbent and the entrant pro…ts functions write as, respectively:
is the consumer indi¤erent between buying the low quality bundle and the base good equipped with the high quality complementary variant. Price competition leads to the following equilibrium prices, pro…ts and consumer surplus:
Comparing these two scenarios, we …nd that the incentive to mixed bundling always dominates that to pure bundling, namely
M B I P B I
> 0. Note that under these two scenarios the equilibrium demands for the incumbent coincide. 7 However, under MB the incumbent bene…ts from the presence of the high quality variant. Indeed, he can put in place a sort of price discrimination, thereby raising the price of the base good p u to such an extent that this latter is sold only to consumers buying it equipped with a variant, whatever it is. As for consumer surplus we …nd CS M B
CS
P B > 0. Mixed bundling is thus superior from the social welfare point of view, as it is preferred by the …rms as well as by consumers. 5 Given the demand b
, it is straightforward to …nd these equilibrium variables. Note also that for this and the subsequent equilibria we …nd, we do not assume a priori that the market is, or is not, covered. 6 The proof of this result is available from the authors upon request. See Gabszewicz, Sonnac and Wauthy (2001) for an interesting analysis related to this point. 7 At equilibrium the demand for the incumbent is b = Acquisition strategy Let us now move to consider the case when the incumbent acquires at some acquisition price P A the entrant thereby avoiding open competition. A priori, in this scenario the monopolist can sell all three variants, combinations of two of them, or only one of them, namely the top combination u E at price P E . 8 Suppose that the incumbent sells all the three variants. Then, the pro…t maximization problem writes as
where P E is the price of the high quality bundle; the indi¤erent consumer types are = pu u , e = P I pu u I u and =
. Equilibrium prices, pro…t and consumer surplus are then:
At equilibrium the incumbent sells only the high quality variant. 9 A positive market expansion e¤ect of selling more than one quality is overcompensated by a negative cannibalization e¤ect.
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Equilibrium strategy It remains now to set the equilibrium analysis, namely to see whether the incentive to acquisition dominates that to mixed bundling. To this aim, notice that, in order to be preferred over the alternative, the acquisition proposal should yield the entrant E a gain at least equal to the pro…ts it would get under turning o¤ the proposal, namely M B E . Of course, it follows that the acquisition price P A has to be equal to M B E . Furthermore, it is convenient for the incumbent I to make such a proposal if, and only if, pro…ts obtained when acquiring the entrant after paying the acquisition price are larger than the pro…ts it would get in the alternative scenario, namely Proposition 1 At equilibrium, acquisition always prevails over bundling. 8 Selling only the low combination u I is the pure bundling scenario. 9 In fact P Acq I and p Acq u are such that the demands for the base good alone and the low quality bundle are equal to zero 10 Since the pioneristic contribution of Mussa and Rosen (1978) , a huge amount of literature has considered the pro…tability of quality discrimination by a monopolist in a vertically di¤erentiated market. See Acharyya (1998), Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2002) , inter alia.
Acquisition and welfare
We have shown above that the privately optimal strategy is acquisition. We next wonder whether a competition authority would allow such an acquisition, taking into account that the outside option is MB. For sake of simplicity, as a measure of welfare we consider consumer surplus (CS). Notice however that, moving to the social welfare as alternative measure of welfare would not a¤ect our qualitative results.
Comparing the equilibrium consumer surplus under MB vs Acq, we …nd:
The sign of CS M B
CS
Acq depends on the market size, b and the quality di¤erential u E u I = U ; in particular, it is the same as the sign of:
Simple calculations reveal that:
.
Under MB, both qualities are on sale whereas under Acq, only the high quality good is marketed. So, moving from MB to Acq entails four e¤ects on consumers.
A …rst negative e¤ect linked to the reduction of the number of qualities, in particular some of the consumers that under MB buy the low quality good, do not buy anymore under Acq. This negative e¤ect is stronger, the higher is b, that is the heterogeneity among consumers.
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A second positive e¤ect is due to the fact that some of the consumers that under MB buy the low quality good are now willing to buy the high quality good under Acq. This positive composition e¤ect of demand is particularly strong when the quality gap,
, is high. Finally, when switching from MB to Acq, we have two contrasting e¤ects on prices. On one hand competition becomes milder as we now have only one …rm rather than two; this negative competition e¤ect is not very strong when the market is large (it is as if each …rm had its own segment of the market), in contrast it becomes strong when the market is small, as competition in this case is tough. On the other hand under Acq the monopolist internalizes the double marginalization problem that is at work under MB; this is a positive pricing e¤ect for consumers and it is stronger the lower is b.
12 Comparing equilibrium prices we …nd that for high (resp. low) values of b, namely b > 2 (resp. b < 1) the equilibrium price of the high quality variant under acquisition is higher (resp. lower) than the corresponding one under mixed bundling.
The …rst negative e¤ect linked to the reduction of the number of varieties dominates when b is su¢ cienty large, thus driving the preference for MB over Acq. The third negative competition e¤ect dominates when b is particularly small, thus driving the preference for MB over Acq. Finally, for intermediate values of b, the four e¤ects balance in such a way that the second positive e¤ect dominates as long as the quality gap is high, thus driving the preference for Acq over MB.
The following Proposition summarizes our previous considerations.
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Proposition 2 As long as the market size is either particularly large or small, acquisition is welfare detrimental. In contrast, for an intermediate market size acquistion is welfare improving if and only if the quality gap is su¢ ciently high.
This result represents something to chew on by competition agencies when evaluating proposed mergers. Indeed, it shows that in vertically di¤erentiated markets, the traditional welfare enhancing e¤ect (taking place when the double marginalization is removed) can be magni…ed by a positive composition e¤ect of demand. Further, as the negative horizontal externality can play a minor role when the market is su¢ -ciently large, it may well happen that, even when enhancing a monopoly structure, M&As can bene…t consumers.
Conclusion
This note sheds light on the e¤ects of joint ownership of complements when they are vertically di¤erentiated. Although our model is highly stylized, still it provides strong arguments for the positive nature of network integration among …rms in vertically di¤erentated markets, while showing at the same time that, under some circumstances, anti-competitive consequences can be observed. 12 These two e¤ects on prices resemble the horizontal and vertical externatlities observed by Economides and Salop (1992) . 13 The full proof Proposition 2 involves tedious comparisons and is available from the authors upon request (also with comparison of the total social welfare under MB vs Acq).
